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Gepubliceerd op woensdag 23 november 2011
IT 587
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Wholesale indirecte distributie

Europese Commissie beschikking 27 oktober 2011, Case No COMP/M.6323 - TECH DATA EUROPE/ MuM VAD BUSINES.

Mededingingsrecht. Concentratie op de markt van wholesale van indirecte distributie software, "Value-Added Distribution".e. Art. 6 lid 1 sub b Verordening (EG) nr. 139/2004, grootdistributie van elektronische producten, vooral IT-producten, met name software. Dit is naar Europees recht een toegestane mededingingsrechtelijke concentratie, omdat totale marktaandeel erg laag blijft op de afgebakende markt.

40. Nevertheless, the combined market share of the parties in these markets post transaction  will remain relatively low.

41. Furthermore, the increment in market share post-transaction would be minimal in the wholesale market for the indirect distribution to VADs of software in the EEA (+[0-5]%) and the following Member States: Austria (+[0-5]%), Belgium (+[0-5]%), France (+[0-5]%), Germany (+[0-5]%), and the Netherlands (+[0-5]%).

42. The highest combined market share would be reached in the wholesale market for the  indirect distribution to VADs of software in Poland. However, the increment in the market share would be relatively low, amounting to only [5-10]%.

43. Finally, there would remain a sufficient number of significant competitors post-transaction, as according to the parties, the major competitors in the wholesale market for the indirect distribution to VADs of software in Poland are ABC Data with an estimated market share of around  [20-30]% and Arrow with an estimated market share of around  [10-20]%, together with two other competitors holding estimated market shares of around [10-20]%, and four other competitors with estimated market shares of around [0-10]%.

44. In light of the analysis above, the Commission considers that on the markets for  the wholesale distribution of software products, the notified operation does not raise serious doubts as to the compatibility with the internal market

Conclusion
For the above reasons, the European Commission has decided not to oppose the notified operation and to declare it compatible with the internal market and with the EEA Agreement. This decision is adopted in application of Article 6(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation